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Abstract— The relations between intuition, axiomatic method and formalism in Hilbert's foundational studies 
has been discussed several times, but geometrical ones still have unclear sides and there is not a commonly held 
opinion. 
In this article we try to frame Hilbert’s geometrical works within a historical context. The aim is to show that in-
tuition and nature of the axioms in Grundlagen der Geometrie do not derive from a mature philosophical aware-
ness of the author, but from the development of a historical path of the idea of geometry and of its foundations. 
The path begins with the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry and finds in Hilbert’s work its final and definitive 
synthesis for Euclidean geometry. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The studies on non-Euclidean geometries by Lobačevskij 
and Bolyai dates to the 1820-30s [49, 6], but initially, ex-
cept from Gauss and his student Riemann, very few math-
ematicians recognized the meaning of the new geometries. 
Only after over thirty years some of them, like Helmholtz, 
Klein, Lie, Poincaré and Russell began to study the new 
geometries. It is known that Gauss had warned about the 
rising of “the cry of the Boetians”, because the subject was 
destined to clash with Kant's conception of geometry. The 
debate took place inevitably by the hands both of Kantians 
and the different mathematical schools, which intended to 
propose their foundational visions.  
The debate went on for almost fifty years until 1899, when 
Hilbert published the Grundlagen der Geometrie. In what 
follows a brief description of the milestones on foundation 
of geometry from Riemann to Russell and of the conse-
quent debate, in particular on the use of analytical method 
in geometry; finally the synthesis made by Hilbert in the 
Grundlagen. 
 
II. BRIEF SKETCH ON FOUNDATIONS OF GE-
OMETRY 
2.1 Riemann’s manifold 
Riemann’s inaugural lecture for academic teaching (Habil-
itationvortag) was published posthumous in 1868, two 
years after his death, with the title On the Hypotheses 
which lie at the Base of Geometry [66]. Following Torret-
ti's notation [72, p. 156], Riemann's hypotheses are: 
Ri1 Space is a continuous manifold of  n dimen-
sions, i.e. a multiplicity of points, each of 
them identified by n coordinates that vary con-
tinuously with the displacement of the point; 
Ri2 For any n-dimensional manifold the algebraic 
expression of the distance between two infi-
nitely close points is “the square root of an 
always positive integral homogeneous func-
tion of the second order of the quantities 
idx  
[with i from 1 to n], in which the coefficients 
are continuous functions of the quantities 
ix  
that is 
ij i j
ij
ds g dx dx   
where 
ijg is the matrix of coefficients.
1 
                                                          
1 The simplest examples are Euclidean space and spherical sur-
face. For three-dimensional Euclidean space
ijg  is  
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
 
 
 
  
, if 
1x x , 2x y , 3x z , the distance of a point infinitely close 
to the origin of the reference system is given by 
 2
2 2 2
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
ij i jij
dx
ds g dx dx dy dx dy dz
dz
dx dy dz
   
   
       
      
  
 , 
that is the usual Pythagorean distance. For the spherical bidimen-
sional surface of radius R, 
ijg  is 
2
2
2
1
0
sin
0
R
R

 
 
 
 
  
 if 
1x   and  
2x  , the distance of a point infinitely close to the origin of the 
reference system is given by 
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Direct consequences of these two hypotheses are the pos-
sibility of conceiving spaces having more than three di-
mensions and the possibility of conceiving a virtually infi-
nite amount of new geometries “without having the slight-
est spatial intuition”,2 by changing the elements of the ma-
trix 
ijg .
3 
The virtually conceivable geometries are limited by a third 
hypothesis: 
Ri3 The length of lines is independent of their po-
sition, and consequently every line is measur-
able by means of every other. 
Therefore, of all the possible geometries, only those in 
which the length unit of measurement is constant are use-
ful: this means Euclidean, hyperbolic and elliptical geome-
tries.4  
Another further limitation derives from the application of 
previous hypotheses to physical space, so Riemann intro-
duces two other hypotheses: 
Ri4 Space is an unbounded three-fold manifold-
ness, [this] is an assumption which is devel-
oped by every conception of the outer world; 
Ri5 From astronomical measurements [the curva-
ture] cannot be different from zero. 
Riemann, in other words, while showing the logical 
possibility of many independent from spatial intuition 
geometries, admits it will be “extremely unfruitful”5 to 
                                                                                               
 
2
2
2
2
2
2 2
2 2
1
0
0
1
ij i jij
dR
ds g dx dx d d
dsin
R
sin
d d
R R
 
   
        
   
  

   
  
2 Fragment XVI, 40r of Riemann's Nachlass, quoted in [71]. 
3 The elements of 
ijg , and therefore the coefficients of ds, can 
take any values with any dependence on the coordinates, hence 
the different geometries are virtually infinite. 
4 These geometries are the only ones with constant curvature; 
Euclidean geometry has a zero curvature, hyperbolic a negative 
curvature and elliptical a positive one. The concept of surface 
curvature was initially developed by Gauss and generalized for n-
dimensional manifolds by Riemann. The curvature k of a surface 
at a point P is
min max
1 1
Pk
r r
  , where minr and maxr are the radii 
of the minimum and maximum tangent circle to the surface in P. 
If c remains constant as P moves on the surface, then the surface 
has a constant curvature [18, pp. 17-18]. 
5 Fragment XVI, 40r of Riemann's Nachlass, quoted in [71]. 
study those geometries that have no actual physical 
evidence. 
2.2 Helmholtz’s geometry of rigid bodies 
Helmholtz replied to the Riemann's Habilitationvortrag 
publication with an article with a significantly similar title 
On the Facts Underlying Geometry.6  
In Helmholtz opinion the weakness of Riemann’s hypothe-
ses was having ignored the right starting point, that is “the 
primary measurement of space is entirely based upon the 
observation of congruence” [25, p. 41]; observation that 
presupposes the existence of rigid bodies free to move in 
space, unchanged in shape and size, during displacement 
or rotation. 
According to Helmholtz, the existence of mobile, but rigid, 
bodies is a preliminary condition for the foundation not 
only of any kind of metric, but also of any geometry  [26, 
p. 24]. 
Helmholtz opposes to Riemann's “hypotheses” the founda-
tion of geometry on “the observational fact, that in our 
space the motion of fixed spatial structures is possible with 
that degree of freedom with which we are acquainted, and 
from this fact the necessity of the algebraic expression 
which Riemann set down as an axiom” [26, p. 15]. 
Then he advances a system of axioms to describe the spa-
tial relations and the invariant motion of rigid bodies: 
He1 Space of n dimensions is an n-fold extended 
manifold. In other words, the individual speci-
fied in it, the point, is specifiable by measur-
ing any continuously and independently vary-
                                                          
6 Helmholtz’s articles on this topic are actually two [24, 25]. On 
the dating of the first one there was a misunderstanding due to a 
typo in the original publication in Verhandlungen des naturhis-
torisch-medicinischen Vereins zu Heidelberg; “22 may 1866” 
instead of “22 may 1868” [76], which was then repeated in the 
Helmholtz's scientific work collection [28, pp. 610-617] and in 
other subsequent editions. This mistake led some historians to 
anticipate Helmholtz's first article on geometry by two years, 
when Riemann was still alive [e.g. 57, 72], generating a misinter-
pretation of Helmholtz's works. In January 1867 Schering wrote 
an obituary for Riemann [70], from which Helmholtz knew that 
the topic of the Riemann’s Habilitationvortag was the hypotheses 
at the basis of geometry, which he had also been working on for 
about two years, without having yet published anything. Thus on 
21 April 1867, Helmholtz sent a letter to Schering to ask him for 
a copy of Riemann’s Habilitationvortrag and a month later, on 
18 may 1868, he wrote again to Schering to thank him for receiv-
ing the requested work and to send him for publication the manu-
script of [24], correctly received on “22 may 1868” [43, pp. 254-
255). So Helmholtz was definitely aware of Riemann's work 
before writing his own. 
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ing magnitudes (coordinates), whose total 
number is n; 
He2 Between the 2n coordinates of any point pair 
belonging to a body fixed in itself, there exists 
an equation which is independent of the mo-
tion of the latter, and which for all congruent 
point pairs is the same; 
He3 Completely free mobility of fixed bodies is 
presupposed; 
He4 If a fixed body rotates about n-1  of its points, 
and these are so chosen that its position then 
depends only upon one independent variable, 
then rotation without reversal finally returns it 
to the initial situation from which it started; 
He5 Space has three dimensions; 
He6 Space is infinitely extended. 
Helmholtz, like Riemann did, attributes a fundamental role 
to the coordinates since the very first axiom, but he adds 
another condition, not mentioned by Riemann, besides 
continuity: derivability; “by continuity of change during 
motion we do not merely mean that all values of the 
changing magnitudes intermediate between the terminal 
values are run through, but also that derivatives exist” [25, 
p. 42].7   
Even if improperly, as Lie will later show [47], Helmholtz 
uses axioms “only for points having infinitely small coor-
dinate differences”, and calculates the algebraic expression 
of a quantity ds “which remains unchanged during any 
motion of two points which are fixedly connected to each 
other and whose separation is vanishingly small” [25, p. 
56]. Then he concludes: “With this we have got to the 
starting point of Riemann's investigations” that is a homo-
geneous second degree expression of the differentials of 
the coordinate 
1 2 3, ,x x x , ultimately equal to Riemann’s 
expression for metric. 
So despite the apparent initial differences and the con-
trasting titles of the two papers, Helmholtz himself states 
that he “had essentially taken the same path as that fol-
lowed by Riemann”. 
                                                          
7 In spite of Riemann was one of the few mathematicians of the 
time who disagreed with the common opinion that a continuous 
function at every point of its domain was always derivable, it is 
not known why in his hypotheses he did not specify derivability 
condition. He even proposed an example of a continuous function 
that could not be derived at any point, which turned out to be 
wrong [9 p. 231]. Probably Riemann did not refer to the deriva-
bility condition either because in 1854 he had not yet come to 
that conviction or he omitted it for the composition of the audi-
ence during his inaugural lecture, mostly philosophers and not 
mathematicians.  
2.3 Klein’s and Lie’s transformation groups 
The same path has been also taken by Klein and Lie. Start-
ing from Helmholz's empirical observations on the motion 
of rigid bodies and preservation of shapes and size, Klein 
and Lie review Helmholtz's approach on the basis of their 
new theory of transformation groups. 
In 1872 Klein, with the famous Erlangen Program [42], 
unifies under the more general projective geometry the 
different geometries known at that time: Euclidean, hyper-
bolic and elliptic. He lays at the basis of each geometry a 
particular group of transformations. Each geometry is de-
fined by the invariant properties with respect to a specific 
group, i.e. those properties that are preserved during the 
transformation. 
Euclidean geometry is characterized by a group of trans-
formations called isometries that preserve distances and 
therefore the shape and size of rigid bodies. 
The most general geometry in the Erlangen Program is 
projective geometry, where the properties of incidence, 
belonging and alignment are preserved. Within projective 
geometry there are also hyperbolic and elliptical geome-
tries, which are obtained from the more general one 
through transformations that keep unchanged other charac-
teristics, such as the distance between two points, a proper-
ty common to Euclidean geometry. 
Projective geometry is in turn part of topological geome-
try, where only some very general properties, such as ori-
entation and connection, are preserved, it is characterized 
by those transformations called continuous deformations. 
Based on this program, Lie develops the theory of contin-
uous transformations [47], in the language of whose he 
reformulates Helmholtz’s axioms and corrects a couple of 
errors. 
2.4 Poincaré’s conventionalism 
In the 1880s Poincaré had already arrived at a group inter-
pretation of geometry, independently by Klein’s Program, 
of which he was not aware [23]. At the inauguration of the 
1886/87 academic year, he states that “geometry is nothing 
more than the study of a group”, but unlike Helmholtz he 
doesn’t think that experience can help settle the real nature 
of space. He argues “if these hypotheses were experi-
mental facts, Geometry would be subjected to an incessant 
revision, it would not be an exact science'' [60]. 
The common property of not changing distances implies 
that, assuming true the hypotheses of Euclidean geometry, 
every experiment could also be carried out in hyperbolic or 
elliptical geometry. Geometry is therefore a convention, 
such as the choice of a coordinate system or the adoption 
of a metric system, “one geometry cannot be more true 
than another; it can only be more convenient” [62].  
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In 1898 he substantially reaffirms his agreement with 
group theory, while confirming his conventionalism about 
the real nature of space: “We owe the theory which I have 
just sketched to Helmholtz and Lie. I differ from them in 
one point only, but probably the difference is in the mode 
of expression only and at bottom we are completely in 
accord” [63]. 
The point on which Poincaré does not agree is the need to 
consider matter pre-existing to the group concept that de-
scribes geometry of the space in which the matter itself is 
in there. The mathematical form of a group, i.e. its proper-
ties and its dimension, is independent of the existence of 
matter; in other words the different ways in which a cube 
can superposed upon itself do not depend on the matter of 
which it is made. Thus we return to the impossibility of 
defining the nature of space through experience [5]. 
By reversing the priority between matter and form, Poinca-
ré also tries to solve another problem that, as it will be 
seen later, is a key point in the debate on the foundation of 
geometry, namely the a priori use of analytic mathematic, 
which already presupposes a three-dimensional, continu-
ous and differentiable space. 
2.5 Pasch’s and Peano's axiomatics 
The Euclidean model of rigorous science based on the hy-
pothetical-deductive method was taken up by Pasch to give 
a new foundation to projective geometry [54]. 
Pasch's novelty is not only the utmost rigour, so much so 
as to receive the epithet “father of rigour in geometry” 
[16],  but the conviction that 
for a truly deductive geometry, the process of in-
ference must be completely independent of the 
meaning of geometric concepts as it must be in-
dependent of the figures. The relations we should 
consider are only those one established between 
the geometrical concepts in the theorems and in 
the definitions that have been used'' [54, p 98]. 
 
Therefore, in order to make deduction in a truly independ-
ent way from the meaning, no relationship must be omit-
ted, implied or taken for granted and axioms and defini-
tions must be well formulated. 
Today it seems an obvious statement but in the tradition of 
geometry, which considered the axioms as evident and 
unprovable truths, often these were not even explained and 
it was not uncommon the use of an axiom, never presented 
before, to fill a gap in a proof [16]. 
Pasch is the first to overcome Euclid in setting up a rigor-
ous axiomatic system without neglecting any obvious rela-
tion. In Pasch the absolute abstraction of logical deduction 
process, which should be totally unrelated to intuition, is 
contrasted by a radical empiricism in the axiom formula-
tion [17].  Indeed, primitive notions of his system derive 
from direct empirical observations: points are defined as 
bodies that cannot be further divided, segments as the 
shortest path between two points and flat surfaces as the 
external limits of a physical object. Instead, straight lines 
and planes are excluded from primitive notions as entities 
that cannot be directly observed [54, pp. 4 and 20]. 
Another characteristic of Pasch's extreme empiricism is the 
rejection of continuity, as it is not sufficiently supported by 
empirical evidence. He argues “in empirical observation 
you can never consider an infinite number of things” and 
also “a segment cannot contain an infinite number of 
points unless you extend the definition of point away from 
its intuitive meaning” [54, pp. 125-127]. 
With his radical thought Pasch refuses to admit not only 
that a segment is a continuous set of points, isomorphic to 
ℝ,  but also a dense set, isomorphic to  ℚ, this means deny-
ing that between any two points there is always another 
point. 
In Germany, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, 
the idea that continuity was not a property of space was 
also shared by two other leading geometers of the time: 
Wiener and Schur [11]. The latter, in 1899, proves, follow-
ing an intuition of Wiener, the fundamental theorem of 
projective geometry without using continuity, thus made 
analytic geometry free from the axiom of continuity [10]. 
The path opened by Pasch was taken up mainly by Italian 
geometers, in particular by Peano and his school. 
In the two works I Principii di geometria logicamente es-
posti [56] and Sui fondamenti della geometria [57], Peano 
proposes an alternative system of axioms with attention to 
two fundamental questions: the independence of the axi-
oms and the use of implicit definitions for primitive ob-
jects.8   
Independence of the axioms had already been addressed by 
Peano for natural numbers [55] and, considering himself 
“morally certain” also of the independence of his geomet-
ric axioms  [56, p. 5], Peano tries to proceed in the same 
way. Nonetheless the task turns out to be more difficult 
than expected and a few years later, with enviable intellec-
tual honesty, he declares to be still “far from having com-
pleted this proof” [57]. 
Introduction of implicit definitions completes Pasch's pro-
ject of a geometry developed only with deductive process-
es without any direct link with intuition. In Principii, prim-
                                                          
8 The concept of implicit definition dates back to the French 
mathematician Gergonne [19], but its first use in an axiomatic 
system is found in Peano's work. 
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itive entities are not defined; instead of points and seg-
ments, Peano simply uses signs, such as 1 and a, b, c,… 
With the help of other notations and abbreviations, ex-
plained in the beginning of the book, Peano lists axioms, 
theorems and definitions of non-primitive objects in terms 
of primitive ones: 
the reader can understand with the sign 1 any cat-
egory of entities, and with c ab  any relationship 
between any three entities of that category; all the 
following definitions will always be valid, and all 
the propositions will subsist. Depending on the 
meaning given to the undefined signs 1 and may 
be satisfied, or not, the axioms. If a certain group 
of axioms is verified, all the propositions that are 
deduced will also be true, since these propositions 
are only transformations of those axioms and def-
initions [56, p. 5]. 
In Sui fondamenti, actually, it clearly states the idea of 
implicit definition “it will be necessary to determine the 
properties of the undefined entity p, and of the relation-
ship, by means of axioms, or postulates” [57, p. 55]. 
2.6 Kantism of early Russell 
In the last years of the nineteenth century, a very young 
Russell entered in the debate basically with a Kantian 
philosophical point of view. In the conclusions of his Es-
say on Foundation of Geometry [69], he states that the 
only geometry “wholly” a priori is projective geometry, 
because axioms of projective geometry “appear as a priori, 
as essential to the existence of any Geometry and experi-
ence of an external world as such” [69, p. 146]. 
Axioms of projective geometry are common to Euclidean 
and non-Euclidean geometry, and what distinguishes Eu-
clidean from other geometries are empirical characteris-
tics. The axioms of projective geometry are three [69, p. 
132]: 
Ru1 We can distinguish different parts of space, 
but all parts are qualitatively similar, and are 
distinguished only by the immediate fact that 
they lie outside one another; 
Ru2 Space is continuous and infinitely divisible; 
the result of infinite division, the zero of ex-
tension, is called a point; 
Ru3 Any two points determine a unique figure, 
called a straight line; any three in general de-
termine a unique figure, the plane. Any four 
determine a corresponding figure of three 
dimensions, and for aught that appears to the 
contrary, the same may be true of any num-
ber of points. 
These axioms, according to Russell, are authentically tran-
scendental because they are inferable from the fundamen-
tal principle of homogeneity of space or, more generally, 
from the possibility of experiencing externality. 
Russell raises numerous criticisms to Riemann, Helmholtz, 
Klein and Lie. In the Essay he notes that the notion of 
manifold, even if exhaustive for the purposes of analytic 
geometry, is not sufficient to define space in its broadest 
generality, because spatial relations precede the possibility 
of expressing them quantitatively. Projective geometry, for 
example, has no metric relationships. 
But for Russell, Riemann and Helmholtz's quantitative 
method contains an even more difficult assumption to jus-
tify: the superiority of algebra over geometry. Through 
algebraic calculations on coordinate numbers, it is possible 
to obtain theorems and information initially not known, 
but “perception of space being wholly absent, Algebra 
rules supreme, and no inconsistency can arise''. 
Russell is therefore aware of the power of analytical meth-
od, but warns: “Finally [...] only a knowledge of space, not 
a knowledge of Algebra, can assure us that any given set 
of quantities will have a spatial correlate, and in the ab-
sence of such a correlate, operations with these quantities 
have no geometrical import” [69, p. 46]. 
Another section of his essay is dedicated to philosophical 
insights into the foundations of geometry, Russell identi-
fies some contradictions that are present both in the con-
cept of space and in all geometric theories 
The contradictions in space are an ancient theme 
as ancient, in fact, as Zeno's refutation of motion. 
They are, roughly, of two kinds, though the two 
kinds cannot be sharply divided. There are the 
contradictions inherent in the notion of the con-
tinuum, and the contradictions which spring from 
the fact that space, while it must, to be knowable, 
be pure relativity, must also, it would seem, since 
it is immediately experienced, be something more 
than mere relations [69, p. 188]. 
These “inevitable'' contradictions give rise to three other 
recurrent antinomies in all geometric theories: 
I Though the parts of space are intuitively dis-
tinguished, no conception is adequate to dif-
ferentiate them. Hence arises a vain search for 
elements, by which the differentiation could 
be accomplished, and for a whole, of which 
the parts of space are to be components. Thus 
we get the point, or zero extension, as the spa-
tial element, and an infinite regress or a vi-
cious circle in the search for a whole; 
II All positions being relative, positions can only 
be defined by their relations, i.e. by the 
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straight lines or planes through them; but 
straight lines and planes, being all qualitative-
ly similar, can only be defined by the positions 
they relate. Hence, again, we get a vicious cir-
cle; 
III Spatial figures must be regarded as relations. 
But a relation is necessarily indivisible, while 
spatial figures are necessarily divisible ad in-
finitum. 
The antinomy I emerges wherever there is a continuum 
because by its nature “a point must be spatial, otherwise it 
would not fulfil the function of a spatial element; but again 
it must contain no space, for any finite extension is capable 
of further analysis”, therefore “points can never be given 
in intuition, which has no concern with the infinitesimal; 
they are a purely conceptual construction”.  
On the antinomy II we can observe that the point and the 
line can be defined through their mutual relations “two 
points lie on one straight line which they completely de-
termine; and two straight lines meet in one point, which 
they completely determine” [69, p. 127]. In two dimen-
sions the perfect duality does not make trouble because 
two elements of one type (points or lines) define an ele-
ment of another type (a line or a point respectively). It be-
comes more cumbersome when we switch to three dimen-
sions because a plane can be defined by three points (not 
aligned) or by a straight line and a point (not lying on it). 
The perfect duality is therefore not preserved. 
Antinomy III means that the infinite divisibility of space is 
at odd with the fact that reciprocal relations between the 
figures ordered in space cannot be divided indefinitely. 
The solution proposed by Russell is considering the space 
only as an ordered space, a set of “relations between unex-
tended material atoms”. Absolute space for Russell “arises, 
by an inevitable illusion, out of the spatial element in 
sense-perception, may be regarded, if we wish to retain it, 
as the bare principle of relativity, the bare logical possibil-
ity of relations between diverse things'' [69, p. 198]. 
To sum up, in Russell opinion there are at least four prob-
lems in the path on the foundations of geometry by Rie-
mann and Helmholz, the last three of which are unavoida-
ble also in the following developments by Klein and Lie: 
the superiority of algebra and analytical geometry over 
synthetic geometry, the problem of definition of the point, 
the problem of circular definitions and finally the contra-
diction between the infinite divisibility of space and the 
need to have finite spatial relations. 
 
 
 
III. DEBATE ON FOUNDATIONS OF  
GEOMETRY AND ANALYTIC METHOD 
The path covered by Riemann, Helmholtz, Klein, Lie and 
Poincaré is essentially the same, and it is very distant from 
the traditional Kantian way that identified Euclidean space 
as an a priori form of our intuition. 
For Kant axioms are “synthetic a priori principles, insofar 
as they are immediately certain” [40, B760], position that 
philosophers will still keep for a long time. Mathemati-
cians, instead, at the end of the 1800s tend to derive axi-
oms from sensitive intuitions, while having different views 
about their nature: for Riemann axioms are “hypotheses”, 
for Helmholtz “observational facts” [26], for Klein “ideali-
zation of empirical data” [8] and for Poincaré “conven-
tions” [62]. 
By the way Helmholtz, Poincaré, Klein and Lie formulate 
geometric axioms from factual statements or sensitive in-
tuition and Riemann uses observations on physical space 
to identify Euclidean geometry, after having assumed a 
metric for any geometry, even more general than the pro-
jective one. 
Pasch formulates axioms of projective geometry after hav-
ing made a laborious abstraction and conceptualization of 
empirical material. He defines terms and logical relations 
“so that there is no need, after their definition, to return to 
sensitive perception'” [54, p. 17].   A similar process is 
also carried out by Peano. 
Since the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry, mathema-
ticians, in particular in Germany, have tried to found Eu-
clidean geometry on sensitive intuition, this is the back-
ground in which Hilbert forms his conception of intuition, 
he does not know if “the origin of the intuition is a priori  
or empiric” [32, p. 303), but this is the intuition he has in 
mind. 
On the contrary, early Russell starts from a priori intuition 
and, following Kant's “transcendental aesthetics'', elabo-
rates new axioms for projective and metric geometry. 
Riemann studied Herbart's philosophy and he was deeply 
influenced by him, so much that he declared himself 
``Herbartian in psychology and epistemology (methodolo-
gy and eidolology)” [53]. 
Herbart succeeded at the chair of Kant at Königsberg, in 
1809 after 7 years in Göttingen. He recognizes the problem 
of the thing-in-itself inherited by his predecessor and tries 
to solve it by not completely excluding the empirical da-
tum. For Herbart knowledge “is constituted by a deliberate 
conceptual creation and serves as a theoretical system of 
reference for empirical investigations and thus plays a 
formative role for the cognition of the empirical world” 
[72]. 
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Herbart's philosophy was welcomed by the scientists of the 
period because, contrary to the idealistic development of 
Kantian thought, it acknowledged full autonomy to the 
sciences in particular mathematics and logic.  This view 
saves “realism” of the sciences and in the meantime frees 
science from an immediate correspondence with the em-
pirical reality [59, 70]. 
Riemann affirmed to adopt Herbart's methodology and 
wrote on his notebook these steps 
1. Formation of concepts from perceptions, 
through abstraction 
2. Change or integration of already formed con-
cepts, to overcome contradictions or implausi-
bility.9 
Until the 1980s, it was thought that the key to Herbart’s 
influence on Riemann's work was the philosophy of space 
[72, pp. 107-109] but thanks to a detailed analysis of Rie-
mann's notes, made available by Göttingen University, 
Scholz (1982) and Pettoello (1986) have revealed that the 
most influence is due to epistemology and the method for 
knowledge, even if in the Habilitationvortag Riemann 
does not respect this method, because he forms immediate-
ly his hypotheses neglecting the phase of abstraction and 
conceptualization. This issue about Riemann is still con-
troversial [4, pp. 55-56], but Herbart's process toward 
knowledge seems very closer to the Pasch one. 
Riemann geometry breaks with Kant tradition; Riemann 
conceives a general n-dimensional space and the three-
dimensional physical space is just a particular case. The 
only way to distinguish physical space from other spaces is 
through empirical properties, such as the preservation of 
lengths and the possibility for a rigid body to undergo 
transformations that keep unchanged its shape. Euclidean 
space has no longer a transcendental nature and its charac-
terization is a posteriori. 
Even more openly in contrast with Kantian doctrine seems 
to be Helmholtz's approach because the assumptions that 
had led him to Euclidean geometry were purely empirical. 
The reaction to writings of Riemann and Helmholtz, in 
defence of Kantian orthodoxy, is not to be expected [45, 
46],  as well as the Helmholtz’s rejoinder [27] and the con-
tribution of other eminent philosophers more or less relat-
ed to Kant [13, 49]. 
Krause's criticism of Helmholtz's idea of geometry is radi-
cal and moved by a pride of belonging to the German 
Kantian School: 
If Helmholtz is right, and if Kantian groundwork is 
wrong, the content and method, which necessarily 
                                                          
9 Fragment XVIII, 9 of Riemann's Nachlass, quoted in [60]. 
derive from it, also fall; then the secular direction of 
German philosophy is wrong, and it remains only 
for us to send the young Germans to study philoso-
phy in the English schools [45, introduction]. 
Whereas the criticism of Land will be taken up even out-
side the German Empire. Land accuses Helmholtz that 
“from geometry proper, there is an easy transit into meta-
physics, by the road of analytical geometry” [46]. This 
kind of objection is generalized and strengthened some 
years later by Veronese: 
The analysis applied to geometry serves to give us 
directions also in the study of the principles, but a 
priori it is not known if these directions can be used 
from a purely geometric point of view [74, p. 
XXIII] 
and then by others; for example by Russell: 
 His [of Riemann] definition of space as a species of 
manifold, therefore, though for analytical purposes 
it defines, most satisfactorily, the nature of spatial 
magnitudes, leaves obscure the true ground for this 
nature, which lies in the nature of space as a system 
of relations, and is anterior to the possibility of re-
garding it as a system of magnitudes at all [69, 
p.16]. 
By Poincaré 
Your group [i.e. Helmholtz and Lie's group] pre-
supposes space; to construct it you are obliged to 
assume a continuum of three dimensions. You pro-
ceed as if you already knew analytical geometry 
[63, p. 40] 
and finally by Hilbert: 
In consequence of his method of development, Lie 
has also necessitated the express statement of the 
axiom that the group of displacements is produced 
by infinitesimal transformations. These require-
ments, as well as essential parts of Lie’s fundamen-
tal axioms concerning the nature of the equation de-
fining points of equal distance, can be expressed 
geometrically in only a very unnatural and compli-
cated manner. Moreover, they appear only through 
the analytical method used by Lie and not as a ne-
cessity of the problem itself [35]. 
In response to the criticisms received, Helmholtz expressly 
reiterates its opposition to Kant: 
I am not the one “who is acquainted with a tran-
scendental space having laws proper to itself” but I 
am instead here seeking to draw the consequences 
of what I consider to be Kant's unproved and incor-
rect hypothesis, according to which the axioms are 
taken to be propositions given by transcendental in-
tuition, and I do this in order to demonstrate that a 
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geometry based upon such intuition would be whol-
ly useless as regards objective knowledge  [27]. 
Erdmann, in the 1870s a “disciple of Helmholtz”10 and 
later editor of Kant's works on behalf of the Berlin Acad-
emy, tries instead to reconcile the uniqueness of a priori 
spatial intuition with the different geometries determined 
by Riemann and Helmholtz: 
The fact that our spatial intuition is single is not 
contradicted: we can only conceptualize the general 
intuition of a pseudo-spherical or spherical space of 
a certain measure of curvature. Such uniqueness, 
however, is not absolute anymore because we can 
fix homogeneous parts of those spaces intuitively 
and compare them with the metrical relations be-
tween partial representations of space [13, p. 135]11. 
On the contrary Lotze, which took over Herbart’s chair of 
philosophy at Göttingen, thought that the new geometric 
speculations were “just one big connected mistake" [50, p. 
234]. In his opinion Euclidean geometry provides the only 
description of the world, because of the self-evidence of 
axioms and he discussed Helmholtz arguments against the 
creation of different geometries [72, p. 286]. 
 
IV. HILBERT’S SYNTHESIS 
In 1895 Hilbert moved from Königsberg to Göttingen, at 
the request of Klein who wanted to bring Göttingen Uni-
versity back to the centre of German and European math-
ematics, as it was at Gauss time [68]. The professional 
relationship between Hilbert and Klein dates back to the 
mid-1880s, when Hilbert attended some lectures of Klein 
in Leipzig [65, p. 19]. 
Klein had understood fecundity of formalism and algebraic 
invariants in the study of geometric structures, as shown in 
the Erlangen's Program, even if he continued to rely on 
intuition and mental visualization in geometric reasoning. 
In a note to the Program he wrote “it should always be 
insisted that a mathematical subject is not to be considered 
exhausted until it has become intuitively evident, and the 
progress made by the aid of analysis is only a first, though 
a very important step'' [43]. For this reason, in more recent 
times, he has been accused of superficiality and lack of 
rigour [15].  
On the contrary, Hilbert is considered the champion of 
rigour, founder of the formalism and axiomatic school. But 
the differences between Klein and Hilbert are much less 
marked than the appearance, because finally they “shared 
                                                          
10 As Russell defined him [69, p. 71]. 
11 Translation in English by Biagioli in [4, p. 89]. 
understanding of mathematics as a multi-faceted but fun-
damentally unified body of knowledge” [67]. 
Hilbert's geometric researches are in a logical continuity 
with Klein's one. Klein had proved the coherence of non-
Euclidean geometries by having assumed the coherence of 
Euclidean geometry [41]; Hilbert, in Grundlagen, proves 
the coherence of Euclidean geometry by assuming the co-
herence of arithmetic.12  Klein moreover approved the 
work of his colleague, giving it immediate publication for 
the inauguration of the monument in memory of Gauss and 
Weber in Göttingen in 1899. 
Hilbert opens the Grundlagen with a quotation from the 
Critics to the Pure Reason of his fellow citizen Kant: 
Thus all human cognition begins with intuitions, 
goes from there to concepts, and ends with ideas 
[40, B730]. 
Hilbert's starting point is intuition. The same intuition that 
excelled in Klein's geometric studies and that Hilbert clear-
ly distinguishes from the abstraction used by Pasch and 
Peano and suggested by Herbart: 
In mathematics, as in all scientific research, we en-
counter two tendencies: the tendency toward ab-
straction – which seeks to extract the logical ele-
ments from diverse material and bring this together 
systematically – and the other tendency toward in-
tuition [Anschaulichkeit], which begins instead with 
the lively comprehension of objects and their sub-
stantial [inhaltliche] interrelations.... The many-
sidedness of geometry and its connections with the 
most diverse branches of mathematics enable us in 
this way [namely, through the anschauliche ap-
proach] to gain an overview of mathematics in its 
entirety and an impression of the abundance of its 
problems and the rich thought they contain [32, p. 
V]. 
Hilbert finds the origin of geometry in spatial intuition, 
with two fundamental differences from Klein and Helm-
holtz. 
The first is the continuity of geometric space, a feature 
considered essential also by Riemann and Lie [78]. The 
second concerns a methodological aspect, already present 
in many criticisms: the priority of algebra and analytical 
geometry on synthetic geometry. 
Hilbert does not think that space is a Riemannian, continu-
ous and differentiable, manifold. Indeed in the Grundlagen 
he proves that continuity is not necessary to found Euclid-
ean geometry, because the one-to-one correspondence be-
tween the points of a straight line and the set of real num-
                                                          
12 Chapter 2 of the Grundlagen contains the coherence proof of 
Euclidean geometry 
Journal of Humanities and Education Development (JHED) 
ISSN: 2581-8651 
Vol-1, Issue-6, Nov – Dec 2019 
https://dx.doi.org/10.22161/jhed.1.6.3 
https://theshillonga.com/index.php/jhed                                                                                                                      Page | 281  
bers ℝ is not strictly necessary.  It is sufficient the density 
of the rational numbers ℚ,13  together with a numerable 
amount of square roots. 
On this point Hilbert is in the middle between Riemann, 
Helmholtz and Lie, who saw in continuity a fundamental 
element of their geometry, and the extreme empiricism of 
Pasch, who did not even accept the match between rational 
numbers and points of a straight line. 
On continuum problem, most probably, Hilbert also un-
derwent the influence of Kronecker. The two mathemati-
cians met at least a couple of times [65, p. 31], during 
which Kronecker transmitted to the young Hilbert the 
nodes of his mathematical thought, summarized in the fa-
mous sentence “God created the integers, all else is the 
work of man”.14  
Mathematics for Kronecker, as well as geometry for Pasch 
who was a student of his [17], has its foundation in experi-
ence. Mathematics is a natural science whose objects exist 
in relation to our experience of counting. Consequently, 
the only existing numbers are the positive integers and all 
other mathematical objects must be constructed from these 
ones [7].   Kronecker, as well as Wiener and Schur, is 
therefore contrary to a mathematics based on the continui-
ty of real numbers, and he claims the non-existence of 
those numbers that cannot be built through a finite number 
of operations on integers, such as transcendent numbers.  
From Kronecker's ideas a particular constructivist concep-
tion of mathematics, called finitism, has developed. Fi-
nitists admit the existence of mathematical objects only if 
they can be constructed through a finite number of opera-
tions, a conception that Hilbert will declare in the 1930s 
substantially coinciding with his way of thinking [51, p. 
267]. 
Axiom of completeness, that gives continuity to the system 
of the Grundlagen, is not mentioned in the first edition 
[33], it is added for the first time in the French edition a 
year later [34]. Some different hypotheses have been ad-
vanced on the reason for its adjunction [e.g. 12, 74]. We 
can here suppose Hilbert adds it to reconcile his axiomatic 
treatment with the one of Riemann, Helmholtz and Lie to 
account for the motions of rigid bodies, defined by them as 
continuous spatial transformations. Hilbert dedicates to 
this topic an article [35], then attached in a much larger 
                                                          
13 See axiom II.2 “If A and C are two points of a straight line, 
then there exists at least one point B lying between A and C and 
at least one point D so situated that C lies between A and D” [33, 
p. 6]. 
14 Quoted in [77]. 
form as appendix in the second German edition of the 
Grundlagen [36].  Here we can read in the incipit: 
I have attempted in what follows to formulate a set 
of axioms for plane geometry which while resting 
on the concept of a group contain only simple and 
geometrically clear requirements, and in particular 
assume in no way the differentiability of functions 
included by the motions. The axioms of the set 
formulated by me are contained as particular parts 
in the Lie axioms or, as I believe, can be derived 
immediately from them. 
The axioms are: 
Hi1 The motions form a group; 
Hi2 Every true circle consists of an infinite num-
ber of points; 
Hi3 The motions form a closed set. 
and in the conclusion: 
the arrangement of the axioms [in the Grundlagen] 
is such that continuity is required last15 among the 
axioms so that than the questions as to what extent 
the well-known theorems and arguments of elemen-
tary geometry which are independent of continuity 
arises in the foreground in natural way. In the pre-
sent investigation, however, continuity is required 
first among the axioms by the definition of the 
plane and a motion so that here the most important 
task has been rather to determine the least number 
of conditions from which to obtain by the most ex-
tensive use of continuity the elementary figures of 
geometry (circle and line) and their properties nec-
essary for the construction of geometry. Indeed, the 
present investigation has shown that to this end the 
conditions stated in Axioms I-III are sufficient.16 
Thus for Euclidean geometry, as already proved in 
Grundlagen, continuity is not necessary, it becomes neces-
sary to account for the rigid motions of bodies. It is not so 
for the differentiability, which remains a strong and avoid-
able condition, if we proceed synthetically rather than ana-
lytically. 
Blumenthal reports that Hilbert began working on projec-
tive geometry presumably in 1891, after following a Wie-
ner lecture on the theorems of Pappus and Desargues.  
Previously he had dealt with algebraic invariants  and with 
the theory of numerical fields [78]. 
The theory of numerical fields has played an important 
role in drafting the Grundlagen. Very few researches have 
highlighted this point, but recent studies, after publication 
                                                          
15 Both here and below the bold typeface is by Hilbert. 
16 English translation by L. Unger in [38]. 
Journal of Humanities and Education Development (JHED) 
ISSN: 2581-8651 
Vol-1, Issue-6, Nov – Dec 2019 
https://dx.doi.org/10.22161/jhed.1.6.3 
https://theshillonga.com/index.php/jhed                                                                                                                      Page | 282  
of Hilbert's geometry lectures [22], have shown that one of 
Grundlagen main aims was the introduction of number in 
geometry from inside and not from outside through an 
artificial Cartesian reference system [1, 3, 20]. 
The analytical method, thanks to the certainty of its results, 
had gradually subordinated synthetic geometry to algebra, 
imposing very demanding hypotheses on the idea of space, 
in particular continuity and derivability. 
In the last quarter of nineteenth century, at the height of 
the debate on the foundations of geometry, the need to 
restore the autonomy of geometry was felt not only by 
“pure”' geometricians but also by supporters of Land's 
criticism to Helmholtz, including illustrious mathemati-
cians and philosophers such as Poincaré and Russell. 
Since his first works on projective geometry, Hilbert has 
tried to introduce numbers and arithmetic operations ex-
clusively through internal relations to geometry, using only 
lines and points [30]; at the beginning following von 
Staudt's würfe method [52] and then using the theorems of 
Pappus-Pascal and Desargues [31, 32, 33].  
His intent was to reaffirm the independence of geometry 
from algebra, and perhaps even the priority of the first 
over the second, but without giving up the algebraic tools 
of metric geometry [21]. 
The antinomies II and III rose up by Russell on foundation 
of geometry, i.e. the definition of point and the circular 
definitions, are solved by Hilbert with implicit definitions, 
as Peano did. Hilbert opens the first chapter of the 
Grundlagen by considering three “systems of objects” 
(Systeme von Dingen): points, lines and planes. These ob-
jects are not explicitly defined, but their mutual relations 
are made explicit through the axioms. What matters about 
these objects is not the shape, the dimension, or whether 
they are further divisible, but only the relations described 
through the axioms.  
Virtually, all types of objects that possess the characteris-
tics given by the axioms can equally be taken into account 
as geometric entities. To describe Hilbert's approach, it is 
always appropriate the famous anecdote according to 
which at the end of a Wiener lesson, on foundations of 
geometry, he said “One must be able to say at all times - 
instead of points, straight lines, and planes - tables, chairs, 
and beer mugs”' [65, p. 39].  
In Grundlagen implicit definitions express “certain related 
facts basic to our intuition (Anschauung)", but do not de-
fine objects as such. They attribute to points. lines and 
planes precise relations that Hilbert calls concepts (Be-
griffen): “to be between”, “congruent”, “parallel”, etc. [38, 
p. 39].17 
Here we find a similarity with Russell solution of antino-
my III. For early Russell the empty space is wholly con-
ceptual, because it “is the logical possibility of relation 
between things”' [69, p. 198], as well as for Hilbert, space 
is ultimately determined by concepts, which are relations 
among fundamental objects: points, straight lines and 
planes.  
If axioms that describe relations among these objects are 
all satisfied, then space is Euclidean; if all the axioms are 
satisfied except the parallel one, then the space is non-
Euclidean. If, on the other hand, there are other relations 
among points, straight lines and planes, space can be De-
sarguesian or non-Desarguesian, Pascalian or non-
Pascalian, Archimedean or non-Archimedean and so on. It 
is the set of fundamental concepts that determines the ge-
ometry of space. 
The difference between early Russell's and Hilbert's vision 
is that for Russell, as well as for Kant, the truthfulness of 
geometry was based on the a priori truth of concepts, 
which were based on the more general transcendental prin-
ciple of homogeneity of space. For Hilbert, instead, the 
truthfulness of geometry is given by the logical coherence 
of concepts and therefore of axioms that define them. With 
this statement Hilbert replied to a Frege's observation: 
if the arbitrarily given axioms do not contradict one 
another with all their consequences, then they are 
true and the things defined by the axioms exist [14]. 
For Hilbert a geometric space exists simply just if axioms 
that describe it are not contradictory. 
Nevertheless the quotation from Kant at the beginning of 
the Grundlagen suggests that Hilbert does not stray as far 
away from Kantian thought as it seems and has been ar-
gued elsewhere [e.g. 2].  Better yet, it provides the philo-
sophical key to the reading of the whole work. Hilbert 
hints that in writing the Grundlagen, and in general in his 
study on geometry, he followed the path indicated by his 
fellow citizen. 
Another passage of the Critique of Pure Reason, very 
similar to the opening quotation of the Grundlagen, better 
specifies the nature of intuitions from which the 
knowledge starts, and which Hilbert makes his own also 
for geometry: 
                                                          
17 It is noteworthy that in the first edition sometime Hilbert uses 
the term Begriffen referred to points, lines and planes [33, p. 5], 
but in the seventh edition he corrects the text, refering to them 
with the term Dingen [37, p. 3]. 
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All our cognition starts from the senses, goes from 
there to the understanding, and ends with reason, 
beyond which there is nothing higher to be found in 
us to work on the matter of intuition and bring it 
under the highest unity of thinking [40, B355]. 
A little further on, Kant explains what he means by 
intuition, concept and idea: 
A perception that refers to the subject as a modifi-
cation of its state is a sensation (sensatio); an objec-
tive perception is cognition (cognitio). The latter is 
either an intuition or a concept (intuitus vel concep-
tus). The former is immediately related to the object 
and is singular; the latter is mediate, by means of a 
mark, which can be common to several things. A 
concept is either an empirical or a pure concept, and 
the pure concept, insofar as it has its origin solely in 
the understanding (not in a pure image of sensibil-
ity), is called notio. A concept made up of notions, 
which goes beyond the possibility of experience, is 
an idea or a concept of reason [40, B377].  
Hilbert starts his researches from the intuition of the fun-
damental objects; points, straight lines and planes. He then 
relates these objects through common characteristics as 
described in the axioms. 
These characteristics define pure concepts, “notions” in 
Kantian words, because they originate in the understand-
ing, since we cannot have sensitive images for example of 
all the points lying between two other points or of two 
parallel lines that never meet. The cognitive process ends 
with the idea of geometry determined by the concepts 
made up of these notions. 
In the  Grundlagen we are dealing with Euclidean geome-
try, but Hilbert has also shown how changing one or more 
axioms, and thus modifying the concepts, other perfectly 
consistent geometries are obtained. Hilbert's path differs 
therefore from the Kantian one only due to the not clarified 
nature of the intuitions at the base of the geometry. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Although the Grundlagen do not contain any real discover-
ies or original methodological innovations [15], they have 
been, and still are, the book par excellence of modern Eu-
clidean geometry. One of the reasons for this immediate 
success was Hilbert's ability to make a synthesis of the 
main schools features that had given rise to the debate on 
the foundations of geometry in the second half of the nine-
teenth century. He took from each one the key elements 
and solved problems and contradictions that emerged in 
the debate. 
Hilbert took up Pasch's axiomatic method, in order to be 
unassailable, as Euclid's system was; it had to be absolute-
ly complete and not to omit any concept. With Pasch Hil-
bert also shared the perplexity about the continuum with a 
slight difference: if for Pasch it was impossible because it 
was not found in nature, for Hilbert it was not necessary 
because for the construction of Euclidean geometry a 
countable quantity of points, with the property of density, 
common to the set of rational numbers, was sufficient. 
Another important methodological aspect in the Grundla-
gen is the use of implicit definitions, whose primary birth 
was often wrongly attributed to Hilbert. The choice, bor-
rowed from Peano, was essential to overcome some issues 
in the Euclide’s Elements that Russell considered inherent 
in the treatment of any geometry. 
In common with Riemann, Helmholtz and Klein, Hilbert 
had the starting point of his path towards the foundation of 
Euclidean geometry, which was intuition. The difference 
was that for Hilbert real space was not a three-dimensional 
continuum to be investigated with the means of analytical 
geometry. Hilbert's approach was all within the geometry 
itself. He introduced numbers and arithmetic operations 
thanks to the relations between points and straight lines 
defined through the axioms, so as to keep independent  
geometry from algebra.  
The effectiveness of the achievement was also recognized 
by Poincaré [64], at the time one of the most profound 
mathematician to have criticized the not fully justified use 
of analytic geometry by Riemann, Helmholtz and Lie. 
In his research work on geometry Hilbert followed a philo-
sophical reference that did not contradict the Kantian text, 
as it might seem at first glance. Rather he moved himself 
in the path traced by Kant to achieve knowledge.  Hilbert 
expressed the "fundamental facts relating to our intuition" 
through the axioms, which define the fundamental con-
cepts. Then he concluded with the definition of the idea of 
Euclidean geometry, opening the door to the study of other 
new geometries as the axioms vary. 
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